We study credit allocation across firms in a dynamic economy with financial frictions. In normal times, growth is driven by gradual reallocation of resources from low to high productivity firms. Recessions can slow down or even reverse this process of reallocation due to financial frictions -such as implicit government bailout -favoring low-productivity state-controlled firms. Credit expansion further amplifies this effect. We investigate this mechanism in the context of China's economic stimulus plan introduced in response to the Great Recession, which triggered a large policy-driven credit expansion. Using private firm-level data we document the dynamics of credit allocation and show evidence consistent with reallocation reversal: differently from the pre-stimulus years, new credit under economic stimulus was allocated relatively more towards state-owned, low-productivity firms than to privately-owned, high-productivity firms. * We received valuable comments from
Introduction
A large literature in macroeconomics and development has documented that reallocating resources from low to high productivity firms is an important source of economic growth. In the absence of frictions, this process is fast and resources are allocated to their most productive users. In most countries, however, this process is plagued by frictions, such as the influence of government on capital and labor markets (Buera and Shin 2013, King and Levine 1993) . 1 Examples of this influence include directed lending by government-controlled banks, government subsidies to certain industries, or the preferential access to external finance often enjoyed by state-sponsored firms. In these instances, inefficient firms are artificially kept alive, or even rewarded with larger market shares, often at the expense of private, more productive firms. This problem becomes particularly important during recessions, when preferential access to external finance becomes more prominent and government intervention is more likely to occur. For example, in response to the Great Recession, governments in several countries introduced large fiscal and credit stimulus programs. Despite being praised by international organizations and economists alike, there is scarce empirical evidence on potentially unintended consequences of these programs in terms of resource allocation across firms, especially in developing economies that traditionally suffer from severe financial frictions. 2 In this paper we study the dynamics of credit allocation across firms in China before and after the introduction of a major credit expansion program. We start by documenting a set of stylized facts. First, private firms in China were experiencing a relatively higher increase in borrowing relative to state-owned firms from 2000 to 2008. This is consistent with the gradual reallocation of capital from low to high productivity firms which is often described as an important driver of China economic transformation during the 2000s. 3 Second, this process of efficient reallocation reversed after the introduction of China's economic stimulus plan at the end of 2008. The plan had two main components. First, an increase in government spending of 4 Trillion CNY -or 12.6% of China GDP in 2008 -over two years. 4 Government spending focused on infrastructure projects and 1 Buera and Shin (2013) show how reforms involving retrenchment of government's intervention in the economy can lead to resource reallocation to high productivity firms and growth acceleration. In their seminal work on the relationship between financial development and growth, King and Levine (1993) show that the percentage of credit allocated to non-financial private firms is strongly associated with GDP growth ("A financial system that simply funnels credit to the government or state-owned enterprises may not be evaluating managers, selecting investment projects, pooling risk, and providing financial services to the same degree as financial systems that allocate credit to the private sector", King and Levine 1993, p.721) .
2 For example, in 2008, the IMF managing director Dominique Strauss Kahn and the World Bank president Robert Zoellick described China stimulus plan as a stabilizer for the world economy. Nobel laureate Paul Krugman praised the scale of the stimulus plans in South Korea and China when advocating for larger stimulus in the US.
3 See, in particular, Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) . 4 The announced increase in government spending was twice as large as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) as a share of the country GDP. The ARRA amounted to 5.3% of US GDP social welfare policies, and was in large part carried out by local governments through so-called "local government financing vehicles" (LGFVs), off-balance-sheet companies set up to increase expenditure without officially running a deficit. The second component of the stimulus plan included a set of bank credit expansion policies -such as lower reserve requirements and lower benchmark lending rates. 5 In 2009 and 2010, following the introduction of these credit expansion policies, aggregate new bank loans doubled with respect to their 2008 level. Using firm-level data from the Annual Industrial Survey we document a large increase in borrowing from manufacturing firms in correspondence with this increase in bank credit. In addition, we document that state-owned firms, which display lower marginal product of capital at the outset of the program, experienced larger increase in firm borrowing than private firms during the stimulus years.
We rationalize these stylized facts in a simple theoretical framework. Specifically, we build on Song et al. (2011) to model a dynamic economy in which firms are heterogeneous in two dimensions: productivity and state connectedness, both of which affect their ability to access external finance. Private firms are operated by skilled entrepreneurs, have higher productivity, and rely on both private investments and bank loans to grow. On the other hand, state-connected firms are neoclassical, employ regular workers and in equilibrium only borrow from banks. As in Song et al. (2011) , a country's growth thus derives from the reallocation of resources from the latter to the former. We augment their framework by explicitly modeling recessions and by accounting for implicit government bail-out of stateconnected firms, in addition to modeling limited pleadgeability constraints that plague private firms. Because during recessions firms struggle to survive and differential access to external finance becomes more prominent, the efficient reallocation of capital from low to high-productivity firms slows down and can potentially reverse. We also show that credit expansions amplify the reversal of prior trend in factor reallocation. 6 While Chinaspecific stylized facts certainly motivate the model assumptions, this mechanism applies more generally, and it is informative for policy-driven credit expansions in economies characterized by preferential access to finance for government-connected firms.
In the data, the timing of the reversal in credit allocation is suggestive of this effect being driven by China's stimulus plan, consistently with the forces described in the model. However, we can not rule out other explanations. In particular, the main identification challenge is to isolate changes in firm borrowing that are solely driven by credit supply shocks rather than by different credit demand or investment opportunities faced by firms. in 2008. 5 These credit expansion policies aimed, in part, at providing LGFVs with appropriate financing from the banking sector. However, they had a broader impact on the Chinese economy. At least half of the increase in credit during the stimulus years affected Chinese firms outside of LGFV-financed projectswhich are mostly in the construction and utility sectors. 6 In the model we abstract away from potential social benefits associated with higher allocation of new credit to low-productivity, state-owned firms, such as the preservation of political stability and aggregate employment.
In the spirit of Bartik (1991) , we therefore propose a measure of firm exposure to the credit supply shock generated by the stimulus plan. First, we exploit the fact that different banks experienced different increases in corporate lending during the stimulus years. Second, we couple data on corporate lending at bank-level with balance sheet information at firmlevel from the Annual Industrial Survey, a comprehensive survey that covers all medium to large manufacturing firms in China between 1998 and 2013. As we do not directly observe bank-firm lending relationships, our measure of exposure exploits differences in the geographical location of the branch network of Chinese banks. In particular, we exploit the fact that lending market shares of Chinese banks vary substantially across cities. Therefore, we use data on bank branch addresses before the stimulus years to construct a measure of initial exposure of firms located in each city to the overall lending of each bank. Finally, to capture the effect of local demand shocks as well as sector-specific demand shocks affecting bank lending, we introduce in the equation to be estimated both province and industry fixed effects interacted with time fixed effects. This identification strategy enables us to compare firms that are exposed to the same province-level and sector-specific demand shocks, but that differ in their exposure to changes in national bank lending.
We use this measure of exposure to bank credit supply shocks to study credit allocation across different types of firms and its real effects during the stimulus years. First, we show that firms with larger exposure to bank credit shocks experienced a larger increase in long term liabilities during the stimulus years. Next, we analyze heterogeneous effects across firms with different initial levels of state ownership. Our results are consistent with the simple correlations presented above and the mechanism described in our model. During the stimulus years of 2009 and 2010, the effect of exposure on firm leverage is almost entirely driven by state owned firms. The magnitude of our estimates indicate that, for a 1 standard deviation increase in bank credit supply exposure, state-owned firms experienced a 10-times larger increase in long-term debt with respect to private firms. We also show that firms with lower initial marginal product of capital experienced a relatively larger increase in borrowing than firms with higher initial marginal product of capital during the stimulus years. This result is consistent with existing evidence that state-owned firms are, on average, less productive than private firms in China. 7 This result also suggests an increase in the misallocation of bank credit to the real economy during the stimulus years. Finally, we test for real effects and find that firms with initially lower marginal product of capital experienced relatively larger increase in capital investment during the 7 Song et al. (2011) show that SOE have, on average, 9% lower profitability than private firms in the years 1998 to 2007. Similarly, Brandt, Hsieh, and Zhu (2005) find large differences between SOE and non-SOE in terms of TFP. Hsieh and Song (2015) show that the gap in marginal product of capital between SOE and non-SOE has been closing in the years between 1999 and 2007, but nonetheless find that, in 2007, "capital productivity among state-owned firms and privatized firms remained about 40 percent lower (compared to private firms)." stimulus years. This finding suggests an increase in the misallocation of physical capital during the stimulus years.
One major challenge in disentangling demand from supply forces in our identification strategy is that we cannot account for potentially different demand shocks experienced by state-owned and non-state-owned firms that operate in the same province and narrowly defined sector. One alternative explanation for our results is, for example, that stateowned firms were directly required by the central government to increase credit demand in order to expand investment in infrastructure and construction. In this respect, it should be noted that the firm-level survey used in our paper focuses exclusively on manufacturing firms that should not be affected, at least directly, by this type of policies. However, some manufacturing firms -e.g. steel producers -might have been indirectly affected because they are input providers of other state-owned firms operating in the construction and utilities sector. To rule out this mechanism, we show that our results are robust to excluding firms operating in sectors that are directly connected to construction and utilities through input-output linkages.
Related literature
Our paper contributes to the literature in macroeconomics and development that studies misallocation and the process of reallocation of factors of production across firms. In a seminal study, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that misallocation of factors of production across firms can potentially explain a large fraction of the observed differences in aggregate total factor productivity and income across countries. Therefore resource reallocation across heterogeneously productive firms could contribute substantially to aggregate output (Restuccia and Rogerson 2008) . For example, Buera and Shin (2013) show how reforms involving retrenchment of government's intervention can lead to resource reallocation from low to high productivity firms and larger output growth. Similarly, Song et al. (2011) propose a model where the reallocation of capital and labor from less productive but financially integrated firms to more productive but credit-rationed firms can explain China's fast economic growth and large net foreign surplus despite a high rate of return on domestic investment. Using data on Chinese manufacturing firms, Hsieh and Song (2015) document that 83% of state-owned firms in 1998 were either shut down or privatized by 2007. They also document a convergence in labor productivity between surviving stateowned firms and private firms from 1998 to 2007. But capital productivity still remained 40% higher in private firms in 2007. In another related paper, Gopinath, Kalemli-Ozcan, Karabarbounis, and Villegas-Sanchez (2015) show that, following the adoption of the euro, countries in the South of Europe characterized by less developed financial markets experienced both an increase in capital inflows and an increase in misallocation of resources across manufacturing firms.
Our paper adds to these prior studies by illustrating how financial frictions can im-pact the dynamics of misallocation across the business cycle and the credit cycle. Conventional wisdom on the link between business cycles and resource reallocation follows the Schumpeterian notion that recessions ameliorate underlying resource misallocation absent financial frictions (e.g., Caballero, Hammour, et al. (1994) , Cooper, Haltiwanger, et al. (1993) , and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) ). Most studies considering financial frictions are either silent on efficient allocation of resources over firms with heterogeneous productive efficiency (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ), or conclude that recessions are associated with cleansing (albeit excessive) of the least productive matches (e.g., Ramey and Watson (1997) ). In contrast, our paper documents that recessions can increase misallocation, because financial frictions -such as easier access to finance for state-connected firms -affect resource allocation to a greater extent during recessions. This result applies whenever state-connected firms have lower marginal productivity of capital, which we think is a pattern observed also outside of China. 8 Our paper is also related to a new wave of research that studies the drivers and consequences of China's credit boom, and in particular the large increase in debt of Chinese local governments and the rise of shadow banking. The 2008 stimulus plan encouraged the creation of LGFVs, and several recent papers have analyzed the unintended consequences of this financial liberalization. Huang, Pagano, and Panizza (2016) exploit variation in debt issuance across Chinese cities to show that public debt issuance by local governments crowded out private investment by Chinese firms. Bai, Hsieh, and Song (2016) show that local financing vehicles played an integral role in implementing the fiscal expansion of 2009 and 2010, and off-balance sheet spending by local governments took off afterward, leading to misallocation of credit towards private firms favored by local governments. 9 Closely linked to China's recent credit boom is the rise of shadow banking. Hachem and Song (2016) propose a theoretical mechanism whereby stricter liquidity regulation in the presence of asymmetric bank competition can fuel shadow banking activities and credit growth similar to the one observed in China. 10 Through an alternative mechanism of debt rollover, Chen, He, and Liu (2017) attribute the unprecedented rapid growth of shadow banking activities in China after 2012 as one of the unintended consequences of the massive fiscal stimulus plan. 11 8 Barlevy (2003) also argue that more efficient projects may experience worse credit constraints during recessions because more efficient firms' borrowing more, which differs from our economic channel of heterogeneous financial integration. While they focus on business cycle only, we show that credit expansion makes reallocation less efficient. 9 Other papers studying the short and long run effects of fiscal stimulus through LGFVs include Deng, Morck, Wu, and Yeung (2015) , Ouyang and Peng (2015) , and Wen and Wu (2014) .
10 Higher loan-to-deposit ratio requirement introduced by the Chinese government push small banks to offer off-balance-sheet wealth management products as a form of regulatory arbitrage. Large banks respond by tightening liquidity in the inter-bank market and lending more to non-financial firms.
11 Similarly, Archarya, Qian, and Yang (2016) analyze a proprietary panel data on bank-issued wealth management products and argue that the stimulus plan triggered shadow banking and increased fragility in the banking system. However, Wang, Wang, Wang, and Zhou (2016) contend that shadow banking as China's dual-track interest rate liberalization can lead to efficiency gain.
Our paper focuses on an aspect so far overlooked by this recent literature. As we explain in more details in section 2, China's stimulus package involved pursuing both fiscal stimulus in the form of large government spending, and credit stimulus in the form of relaxing funding and lending constraints of traditional banks. During the stimulus years, as much credit has gone to firms directly as through the local government. The credit stimulus therefore not only facilitated financing local government spending through
LGFVs, but had a broader impact on the Chinese economy, including firms outside the construction and utilities sector.
While our paper primarily draws evidence from China, the world's second largest economy, the insights apply more broadly to various credit expansions, liquidity injections, and stimulus programs around the globe. Therefore, our paper also adds to the general discussion on the efficacy and unintended consequences of intervention policy that aim at stimulating real economic activities or stabilizing financial markets, but may be hampered by market frictions. 12 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional background and highlights the main features of China's stimulus plan. Section 3 develops a dynamic model that illustrates the allocative effects of credit expansion in an economy with severe financial frictions. Section 4 describes the main data sets used in the empirical analysis, and section 5 discusses the identification strategy. Finally, section 6 presents the main empirical results, and section 7 concludes.
Background and Stylized Facts

China Economic Stimulus Plan
The second half of 2008 saw the onset of the global recession. China, after almost 30 years of unprecedented economic growth and with a large exposure to international trade, was at risk of hard landing. To contain a potential slowdown, the Chinese government introduced a large stimulus plan -a combination of fiscal and credit programs. Figure 1 illustrate the structure of the economic stimulus plan. In what follows we describe it in detail.
The fiscal part of stimulus, officially announced on Nov 9 of 2008, prominently featured spending 4 Tr CNY (US$586 billion) over the following two years (2009 and 2010) on a 12 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , and Shleifer and Vishny (2010) , Stein (1998) , and Kashyap and Stein (2000) for general intervention impacts, and more recently Xiong (2017, 2016) and Hachem and Song (2016) . Two close examples related to bank credits are Bleck and Liu (2014) that develops a theory of sectoral misallocation under excessive liquidity injections, and Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2016) which studies the crowding-out effect in bank lending. Rather than discussing monetary transmission through asset prices, or emphasizing regional or sectoral misallocation that could be driven by governments' strategic considerations, we focus on the dynamics of misallocation across firms. wide array of national infrastructure and social welfare projects. The central government directly funded 1.18 Tr CNY -around one-third of the stimulus plan -using government budget and treasury bonds. The remaining 2.82 Tr CNY -around two-thirds of the planned investments -were expected to be financed by local governments. At the beginning of 2009, to help local governments access external financing, the central government facilitated and actively encouraged the establishment of LGFVs, off-balance sheet companies set up by local governments to finance mostly investments in public infrastructure and affordable housing projects. 13 In parallel, the Chinese government encouraged an increase in credit supply to the real economy by banks. Traditionally, the government influences bank credit supply through setting loan quotas, deposit and lending rates, and required reserve ratios. 14 Total loan quotas, which are the lending targets for commercial banks that bank officials are encouraged to meet, were increased from $4.9 trillion CNY in 2008 to almost $10 trillion CNY in 2009. Compliance to new lending targets is usually achieved by the central bank, People's Bank of China (PBoC) through adjusting bank regulation. Part of the stimulus was therefore generated by a relaxation of bank financing constraints. Two most prominent measures are: first, in the last quarter of 2008, the PBoC lowered commercial banks' reserve requirement ratio from 17.5% to 13.5% for medium-sized and small banks, and from 17.5% to 15.5% for large banks; 15 second, the PBoC reduced the base one-year lending rate from 7.47% to 5.31%. 16 A significant fraction of the new bank credit went to LGFVs. As a matter of fact one of reasons behind the changes in banking regulation was exactly to meet LGFVs' borrowing needs. Chen et al. (2017) and Bai et al. (2016) estimate that the fiscal investment target not funded by the central government were largely financed by LGFVs and 90% of the 13 Bai et al. (2016) describe LGFVs in details: these companies are the reincarnation of the trust and investment companies of the 1990s, which helped local governments raise funds from both domestic and overseas investors.
LGFVs existed before 2009 but their activities were heavily restricted for a prolonged period of time. They are typically endowed with government resources. For example, the authors note that after 2010 when LGFV borrowing requirements were tightened, LGFVs heavily utilized government land as collateral to obtain loans from banks and trusts, and increasingly financed private commercial projects after 2010.
14 Credit supply in China has long been constrained. The loan-to-deposit ratio requirement of 75% was written into law on commercial banks in 1995 and was only lifted in late 2015. Most banks other than the Big Four found it difficult to raise inexpensive deposits sufficiently to fund their loan growth while meeting this requirement. Reserve requirement ratio and interest rate regulations were also limiting banks' lending capacities.
15 Large commercial banks refer to Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and Bank of Communications (BoCom); medium-sized and small commercial banks include the remaining 12 joint-equity commercial banks, urban and rural commercial banks, and urban and rural credit unions.
16 Banks are typically allowed to set interest rates within a pre-specified range of the base rate. Until 2014, the permissible range around the base lending rate were 90% -110% for large banks and 90%-130% for small and medium-sized banks. To give banks an extra incentive to lend money instead of hoarding reserves, the central bank also lowered by 0.27 percentage points the interest rates that it pays banks for reserves deposited with it (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/business/worldbusiness/27yuan. html). increase in local government debts during the stimulus period were in the form of bank loans. However, it should be emphasized that the credit expansion had a broader impact on the economy beyond supporting LGFVs. 17 New bank credit to the real economy during the stimulus years far exceeds borrowing by LFGVs. Using a simple extrapolative model, Chen et al. (2017) estimate that in 2009 alone, abnormal bank credit to the real economy was around 4.7 trillion CNY, among which LGFVs received around 2.3 trillion, the nonresidential non-LGFV sector received 1 trillion, and the residential sector received 1.4 trillion. This implies that firms operating in sectors such as manufacturing could have received during the stimulus years comparable additional external finance as construction firms and utility companies contracted or acquired by LGFVs in the same period.
In what follows we present a set of stylized facts using both aggregate and micro data consistent with the above description of the stimulus plan.
Stylized Facts with Aggregate and Firm-level Data a) Aggregate Flow of Credit to Real Economy
We start by presenting a set of simple stylized facts on the credit stimulus using aggregate data. Figure 2 shows the flow of Aggregate Financing to the Real Economy (AFRE-F) according to Central Bank data between 2002 and 2015. The AFRE-F is divided into 5 categories: bank loans, equity financing, corporate bonds, several types of off-balance sheet lending which we group under "shadow banking", and other types of financing. 18 As shown, the annual flow of bank lending to the real economy increased from 5 to 11 Trillion CNY (or around 1 Tr USD) between 2008 and 2009. This is an increase of 7 Tr CNY with respect to the previous 5 years average, or an increase of 5.5 Tr CNY in deviation from a linear trend obtained using 2002 to 2008 data, both far exceeding the increase in LGFV borrowing.
b) Changes in Bank Regulation to Promote Bank Credit Supply
The increase in bank credit documented in Figure 2 is consistent with the measures introduced by the PBoC at the end of 2008 and described in section 2.1. First, in the fourth quarter of 2008, the Central Bank reduced required reserve ratios (RRR) for commercial banks. The rationale was that if banks are required to keep less reserves with the Central Bank, they have more liquidity available for other investments, including lending to the 17 At the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting of New Champions 2009 (Summer Davos), China's Premier Wen described the stimulus package as pursuing both "proactive fiscal policy and easy monetary policy" and emphasized that "Some people take a simplistic view and believe that China's stimulus package means only the four trillion CNY investment. This is a total misunderstanding."
18 The data source is the "Total Social Financing" (TSF) dataset of the PBoC. Following Hachem and Song (2016) we define shadow banking as both loans by trust companies (trust loans) and entrusted firmto-firm loans (entrusted loans). We include bankers' acceptances in the "other" category. It is important to notice that this dataset does not include government and municipal bonds. Also, data for 2015 does not include loans to LGFVs swapped into municipal bonds by initiative of the Finance Ministry. This implies the total flow for 2015 reported here is likely a lower bound of the actual flow.
real economy. Figure 3 shows the evolution of mandatory RRR between 2005 and 2013. The solid lines show the mandatory RRR set by the Central Bank, while the dots show the average actual reserves as a fraction of bank deposits in each quarter observed in the data. We report these numbers separately for large, medium and small banks, as banks of different sizes are subject to different RRRs. As shown, Chinese banks tend to keep reserves as a share of their deposits close to the ratio required by the PBoC. This suggests that, for most banks, RRR is a binding constraint. As shown, banks tend to quickly adjust their reserves in reaction to variation in mandatory RRR. Therefore, the decrease in mandatory reserves observed in Q4 2008 is likely to have freed liquidity that became available for lending.
Second, the Chinese Central Bank lowered its benchmark lending rates for loans of different maturities. Benchmark rates are lower bounds on interest rates that commercial banks are allowed charge to their clients. These benchmark rates tend to be a binding from below constraint for commercial banks. This can be seen in the lower right graph of Figure 3 , where we report the benchmark lending rate for loans with maturity between 6 months and 1 year. As shown, the Central Bank lowered this rate by 2 percentage points in the last quarter of 2008, from 7.47% to 5.31%. In the same graph we also show the interest rate on loans to Chinese publicly traded firms as reported in their company statements. This selected sample of loan-level data shows that (i) interest rates charged are usually close to the benchmark rate set by the Central Bank, (ii) periods in which the Central Bank lowers its benchmark rate are usually accompanied by a larger number of bank loans to publicly traded companies.
c) Credit Flow to Manufacturing Firms
We now document a set of basic stylized facts in our micro data. First, we document that firms covered in the Annual Industrial Survey display a sharp increase in long-term liabilities during the years of the stimulus plan. It is important to keep in mind that, as explained in detail in section 4, this survey covers manufacturing firms and does not include construction companies. 19 The sharp increase in firm borrowing observed in 2009 and 2010 is consistent with the increase in bank credit flows to the real economy reported in Figure 2 and with the changes in banking regulation described above. Figure 4 shows the level and the yearly change in long-term liabilities across firms in the Annual Industrial Survey. To insure comparability over time, we focus exclusively on manufacturing firms with annual revenues above 20 million CNY, for which the survey is effectively a Census between 1998 and 2013. The upper graph of Figure 4 reports the sum across firms of the monetary value of long-term liabilities in each year. The lower graph reports the year on year difference of this sum. As shown, there is a sharp and positive increase in long-term liabilities in both 2009 and 2010. If we interpret long-term liabilities as composed exclusively by bank debt, Figure 4 indicates that bank credit flow to manufacturing firms increased from 70 Bn CNY in 2008 to 1.25 Trillion CNY in 2009. This is an increase of 1 Tr CNY with respect to the previous 5 years average, or an increase of 986 Bn CNY in deviation from the linear trend obtained using 2002 to 2008 data. In deviation from the linear trend, the abnormal bank credit to manufacturing firms observed in 2009 correspond to 18% of the abnormal bank credit flow to the real economy reported for the same years by the Total Social Financing Database and showed in Figure  2 .
d) Credit Allocation Across Manufacturing Firms
After documenting that our data on manufacturing firms do capture an increase in long-term liabilities that is consistent in timing with the credit supply shock introduced by the stimulus program, we document which types of firms experienced the largest increase in borrowing during the stimulus years. To this end, we estimate the following equation:
where the outcome variable is the change in long-term liabilities of firm i between year t−1 and year t (our proxy for new loans) divided by total revenues of firm i in t−1. 20 The subscript c identifies a city, and j a 4-digit sector. The variable C icjt−1 is a pre-determined firm characteristic and captures, depending on the specification, the ownership status of firm i or its level of marginal product of capital M P K. We add to this specification year, city and sector fixed effects, as well as the logarithm of number of workers in year t − 1 as a control for firm size. Finally, we divide the sample in different sub-periods between 1998 and 2013 and estimate equation (1) separately for each sub-period. This allows us to study capital allocation separately for pre-stimulus, stimulus and post-stimulus years. Notice that, in each sub-period, we are effectively comparing firms of similar size that are operating in the same city and sector. Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation (1) where C icjt−1 captures two different pre-determined firm characteristic: state-ownership in panel A, and log of marginal product of capital in panel B. State ownership status is an indicator function equal to 1 if either the government is the controlling shareholder of firm i or the government owns 50% or more of the shares of firm i, which is the proxy used to identify state-owned firms proposed by Hsieh and Song (2015) . We use as a proxy of marginal product of capital the average product of capital computed as industrial value added divided by book value of fixed assets.
As shown, state-owned firms experienced, between 2000 and 2008, between 12% and 50% lower levels of new loans as a share of their revenues with respect to privately owned firms. This is consistent with capital being reallocated from low-productivity SOE to high-productivity private firms during the 2000s. The only exception being the 1998-1999 period, which pre-dates the new policy favoring the privatization of SOEs introduced by the Communist Party's Central Committee in September of 1999. 21 Starting from 2009, instead, state-owned firms experienced, on average, between 10 and 15% higher levels of new loans as a share of their revenues. Notice that the positive correlation between state ownership and new loans extends outside the two years of the stimulus plan to the 2011-2013 period. In Figure 9 we plot the estimated coefficients reported in Panel A of Table 2 along with their 95 percent confidence intervals for each sub-period.
Next, in panel B, we estimate equation (1) where C icjt−1 is log of marginal product of capital. The estimates show that, between 2000 and 2008, new loans were allocated relatively more towards firms with higher initial marginal product of capital. This trend is reversed during the stimulus plan years, when new credit is allocated relatively more to less productive firms.
The timing of the correlations presented in Table 2 is suggestive of an effect of the stimulus plan on credit allocation between SOE and non-SOE firms, and across firms with different initial marginal product of capital. However, it is important to emphasize how the estimates presented in this section cannot be interpreted as directly derived from credit supply shocks. This is because we cannot separate the effect of the stimulus or other forces affecting credit supply from credit demand forces operating contemporaneously. Before we present an identification strategy that aims at disentangling supply from demand forces in section 5, we first rationalizes the aforementioned stylized facts in the next section.
The Model
This section develops a dynamic model to illustrates how financial frictions affect credit allocation across firms. Our model builds on Song et al. (2011) , but instead of focusing on the buildup of foreign surplus during economic transition, we focus on credit expansion in a time-varying and uncertain economic environment.
Setup and Assumptions
Time is discrete and infinite. There are two types of firms in each period, both requiring capital and labor to operate. A unit measure of state-owned or state-connected enterprises (S firms) operate as standard neo-classical firms and, as discussed in more details later, have better access to banks' credit because the state acts as a guarantor for the loans they take. Private enterprises (P firms) are started and operated by skilled young entrepreneurs using capital from private financiers (successful, old entrepreneurs) or banks or both.
The production technologies of S and P firms are as follows,
where y, k, and n are output, capital, and labor, respectively. Capital fully depreciates and firms shut down after each period.Ã S,t = A t with probability µ t (success), and 0 otherwise (failure). Similarly,Ã P,t = χA t with probability µ t , and 0 otherwise. A t is the labor-augmenting technology, and we assume it to be a constant and model the time-varying environment including the economic recession through the changes in µ t . Entrepreneurs, workers, and bankers populate the economy. A measure N t of workers work for either P firms or S firms, and get paid the equilibrium wage when the firm is successful, which they consume in each period. 22 We set N t to be a constant to focus on the labor share dynamics and illustrate key mechanisms. 23 A measure M t of skilled entrepreneurs are born in each period and live for two periods, with preferences parametrized by:
where β is the discount factor, θ ≥ 1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption c that ensures private investment (discussed later) to be non-decreasing in the rate of return, t marks the period in which an entrepreneur is born. We similarly normalize M t = 1. In the first period, young entrepreneurs each starts a P firm (with the help from successful old entrepreneurs from the previous period), makes operation decisions, obtains a fraction φ of the profit, consumes, and places the remaining profit either in the bank deposits (or directly lending to S firms) which earns weakly less than R S in the next period, or a private fund that invests in a diversified portfolio of private enterprises that operate the next period. 24 In the next period, if old entrepreneurs have invested in a private fund, they get a fraction 1 − φ of each P firm they invest in.
There is a unit measure of risk-neutral intermediaries (banks) each with Q t unit of credit supply in period t. We model credit expansion or contraction as exogenous un-22 Song et al. (2011) model workers as OLG to explain foreign surplus, but it does not add to our results. For simplicity, we model workers as "hand-to-mouth".
23 Population growth and demographic changes can be easily incorporated, but are less prominent around the stimulus period and do not add to our economic mechanism. 24 We believe that allowing entrepreneurs to share the profit and loss is the major distinction between P and S firms, and captures the historical reforms of State-owned enterprises in China. Alternatively, φ could be a bargaining outcome, or determined by agency frictions as described in Song et al. (2011). expected shifts to Q t that is otherwise stable. 25 The credit market is competitive and bankers rationally set lending rates to S and P firms to clear the market.
The state acts as a guarantor for the loans S firms take, which leads to two financial frictions. First, as in Song et al. (2011) , P firms can only pledge a fraction η of the firm value for paying off loans and interests to banks. In other words, when a P firm is successful, R P,t l P,t ≤ ηπ t (k P,t , n P,t ), where R P,t is the gross interest rate for P firms, l P,t is the amount of lending, and π is the after-wage revenue. This limited pledgeability friction is absent for S firms because the state can always supply additional assets and collateral. 26 Second, when the S firms fail, the state bails them out and pays off the loan with positive probability b. This corresponds to situations in which state-owned banks write off debts of bankrupt SOEs and a government-run committee reorganizes or merges the assets with other SOEs. As such, bankers in expectation get
There thus naturally emerges a dual-track interest rate, R S,t l = δR P,t l, that is observed in reality. δ = µ µ+(1−µ)b captures how much S firms are differentially favored in terms of interest rates or cost of capital (the interest rate friction). 27 The differential pledgeability constraints and interest rates can be thought as reflecting several real world frictions commonly observed in emerging economies transitioning to market-based systems but where state influences still linger (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Wang et al. 2016; Song et al. 2011) . For example, loan officers prefer to lend to Stateconnected or SOEs for several reasons: (1) the government more likely bails them out which prevents loan defaults; (2) SOEs are typically larger which enables bankers to complete lending quota or satisfies their empire-building motives with less effort; 28 (3) bankers have less screening cost and responsibility when lending to SOEs, especially during the stimulus, since they are less to blame in events of default or non-performance. 29 Moreover, loan officers and banks' incentives are not fully aligned with the intention of the stimulus due to individual career concerns, personal network, and uncontractible effort and unobservable quality. The two frictions in the model adequately capture these phenomena, and are essential drivers for the gradual reallocation of resources between S 25 In reality, Q t is time-varying post-stimulus and the stimulus could have been anticipated. This is not crucial to our results. 26 We can alternatively set η = 1 for S firms and show in equilibrium the constraint does not bind. 27 A revealing example of selective bail-out by the Chinese government is the case of China Eastern and East Star Airlines. The former is a state-owned enterprise while the latter is privately owned. Both airlines were in financial distress at the beginning of 2009. China Eastern obtained a capital injection of 7 billion CNY from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). East Star Airlines, on the other hand, could not raise new capital and was declared bankrupt in August 2009. 28 They generally believed that lending to SOEs is safer, and were under pressure from the government to sharply increase lending over a short period of time that was insufficient for careful screening. 29 The government typically does not let SOEs go to court, and banks can always track down the government who needs to be responsible for paying off the loan (many SOEs are not limited liabilities, or even when they are, government cares about reputation and social stability enough to pay off the loan), but have difficulties dealing with private entrepreneurs who have limited liabilities. and P firms.
Notice that δ < 1 does not imply that SOEs do not go bankrupt. What we assume is that if that happens, the government is likely to repay creditors. This matches real life observations in that many insolvent SOEs are being kept alive because creditors (mainly state owned banks) do not initiate bankruptcy proceedings, or the government invokes an escape clause contained in Article 3 of the 1986 trial bankruptcy law. The government also frequently plans reorganization or merger of bankrupt SOEs. Alternative to government bailouts, δ can also capture bankers' incentive distortions. For example, the probability that they are to blame for bad loans is lower if they lend to S firms. 30 We further assume: (1) [δη] α χ 1−α < 1, otherwise the pledgeability constraint never binds for P firms. (2) 
> 1, to ensure old entrepreneurs invest in the private fund that finances P firms, rather than lending to S firms. This automatically implies χ > 1, which captures the well-documented fact that S firms are typically less efficient than P firms (Brandt and Zhu (2000) ; Song et al. (2011) ). (3) Young entrepreneurs prefer starting their own firms rather than getting paid as workers. In other words, a business owner or manager gets compensated more than a regular worker. 31
Dynamic Equilibrium
An S firm maximizes its static profit in each period, taking the interest rate R S and wage w as given. For notational simplicity, we leave out the time t subscript unless there is ambiguity. Since it gets nothing in the failure state, an S firm solves the following optimization in each period:
First-order conditions pin down the equilibrium wage:
Now P firms, if successful, pay wage to workers, pay back the loan, and then distribute the residual profit to young and old entrepreneurs. A failed P firm does not make any payment. Because old entrepreneurs' investment is diversified across P firms, each old entrepreneur gets
where k P = l P + s P is the total capital, and s P is investment from old entrepreneurs. If a P firm is successful, the young entrepreneur running it gets paid
Thus young and old entrepreneurs would take the same decision regarding borrowing and labor employment, fixing private capital s P . Given capital k P , P firm's maximized gross profit (when successful) is:
The employment and entrepreneurs' maximized gross profit (when successful) are
. The entrepreneur's lifetime utility maximization problem, conditional on initial success and subject to limited pledgeability is:
where m t = (1 − ηB t )ρ t k t is his or her total payoff in period t, and B t is an indicator of whether the pleadgeability constraint is binding in period t. When 1 η > δχ 1−α α > 1, we have ηρ < R P < ρ, the first inequality ensures the pledgeability constraint could be binding, second inequality implies borrowing more is always profitable to the young entrepreneur, and thus the constraint actually binds. However, the pledgeability constraint could become non-binding if δχ 1−α α < 1, and P firms stop borrowing. 32 In either case, 32 Because µ goes down in a recession, making this a more likely scenario.
there is a unique optimizer
The equilibrium can then be solved in closed-form using the market clearing conditions:
Credit Demand
(2)
Discussion and Implications
Reallocation of Capital and Labor
We first examine the dynamics of factor reallocation. The growth rate of P firms in capital and labor share is driven by
whereψ t = 1−ηB t−1 1−ηBt ψ t . We note that the growth rate depends on private capital s P as a state variable and on the financial frictions. More private capital and less financial friction would make private firms grow faster. For constant credit supply and workers' population across two periods, 1 + γ t completely captures the reallocation dynamics and is our main object of focus.
Dynamics of Misallocation
If the total output of the economy is simply the sum of individual firm outputs, we can define the aggregate TFP through equating the total output under the same production function,
where λ k,t and λ n,t are the shares of capital and labor of the S firms. In our stylized model, χ > 1 implies the efficient benchmark is to allocate all resources to the more productive P firms. Therefore a simple measure of misallocation of capital and labor are λ α k,t and λ α n,t respectively, and the distortion on aggregate TFP can be summarized by
which ranges from 0 (efficient allocation) to ∞ (least efficient allocation). 33 Figure 6 displays this distortion over time using firm-level data from the Annual Industrial Survey in the years 1998 to 2013.
Stimulus and Recession
We now discuss how the stimulus and recession affect the transition dynamics. At time t, ρ t−1 is already determined. Decompose (4) 
ρt which is increasing in µ, and η, decreasing in b, and independent on Q.
First, we note that ∂(1+γt) ∂Q < 0. Intuitively, an increase in Q will cause R S,t to fall, then ψ t (which reflects private investment) decreases while ψt ρt (which is related to the financial frictions) does not change, therefore γ t decreases. This means that regardless of the economic condition and whether the pledgeability constraint is binding, a credit expansion disproportionally supports S firms and slows down the reallocation of resources to P firms. Economically, as R S goes down, S firms demand more capital and labor, driving up the wage. Consequently, the P firms' capital productivity is lower. Foreseeing this, for a given payoff when they are young, entrepreneurs consume more and invest less in the private fund because the marginal benefit of private investment (P firms' capital productivity) is lower. This slows down the growth of private capital in the production, which reduces k P no matter the pledgeability constraint binds or not. Therefore, a credit expansion slows down the growth of P firms in terms of shares of the economy, or even reverse the reallocation of labor and credit from S firms to P firms. Similarly, we note ∂(1+γt) ∂µ > 0 because ψ andψ t ρt are both increasing in µ. An economic downturn also slows down the reallocation process by limiting the saving and private investing of young entrepreneurs.
From this, we conclude that credit expansion or decline in economic environment in the presence of credit allocation friction both slow down P firms' growth. 34 Moreover, the 33 First-order conditions from optimizing the TFP give two alternative indicators for misallocation: the differential marginal productivity of capital and labor (MPK and MPL) between S and P firms. The intuition is that under diminishing returns to scale, resources should be allocated preferentially to the firm with higher marginal productivity in capital or labor.In reality, firm productivity and funding friction are generally not binary, and the technology parameter A would evolve differently for different firms. Nevertheless the intuition of examining the dispersion in the marginal productivity still applies, and the difference of marginal productivity between SOE and non-SOEs after controlling for other firm characteristics constitutes a proxy for misallocation.
34 This slow-down of the reallocation process can also be obtained in the original model in Song et al. cross partial ∂ 2 (1+γt) ∂µ∂Q can be negative for a wide range of parameters, which implies that credit expansion in bad economic environment may reduce efficient factor reallocation even more and increase the likelihood of reversal (interaction effect). We illustrate these predictions of the model in terms of credit share of S firms in Figure 7 (capital and labor shares are similar). The upper panel shows the case in which the economy experiences a permanent change (T = 8) in credit supply (higher Q) and deterioration of economic environment (lower µ). The lower panel shows the case in which the economy experiences a temporary change in both credit supply and economic environment, after which the economic conditions and credit supply go back to their original levels. Notice how, in the latter case, it still takes an additional 6 periods for the economy to get back to the original reallocation path. This delay in the reallocation of resources from S firms to P firms can have significant impact on real outputs and economic growth. The figure also shows that both recession and credit expansion can slow down or reserve the efficient reallocation, and credit expansion during recession exacerbates the reversal.
Both Figure 6 and Figure 8 show the model predictions well capture stylized facts observed in the data. Figure 8 reports the share of SOE in: total number of firms, total revenues, total long-term liabilities and total book value of physical capital. As shown, the share of SOEs has been increasing in all these dimensions starting from the stimulus years, reversing the prior trend. The reversal is particularly strong for the SOE share in long-term liabilities and physical capital, which almost reversed to their early 2000s levels.
Financial Frictions
Let us examine the role of financial frictions. Both limited pledgeability and interest rate frictions control the speed of growth of P firms relative to S firms. The former is more important when interest rates are low and firms want to borrow from banks; the latter is more prominent during recessions when bailout matters more. With limited pledgeability alone, there could be no borrowing by both firms. With interest rate friction alone, there could be infinite borrowing by P firms. Both frictions are realistic and in combination reflects differential access to credit by S and P firms.
Next we examine how reducing financial frictions affects transition dynamics. Because ∂(1+γt) ∂b < 0, reducing the interest rate friction always facilitates the reallocation of resources from S firms to P firms. One might think that increasing η or reducing b (same as increasing δ and fixing µ) drives up R S when pledgeability constraint is binding. All these in turn leads to higher ψ. This is in general not true due to a general equilibrium effect. Reducing the financial frictions make P firms demand more loan and labor, but the latter could be more dominant, resulting in increased wage and a larger decrease in (2011) by exogenously lowering interest rates. However, we need the additional assumption that the pledgeability constraint is always binding. loan demand from S firms. Subsequently interest rate could decrease and entrepreneurs borrow more and save less private capital, slowing down the reallocation. That said, if P firms are sufficiently productive, ∂(1+γt) ∂δ > 0, i.e., reducing the pledgeability constraint also speeds up the reallocation. One sufficient condition is
which still satisfies ηδχ 1−α α < 1 (pledgeability constraint binding). Interest rates are exogenous in Song et al. (2011) , and relaxing the pledgeability constraint always facilitates the reallocation of resources from less productive firms to more productive firms. Equation (4), however, is increasing in ψ t , which can be increasing in η if and only if δχ 1−α α > 1. Hence we see that in addition to directly contributing to the misallocation of credits, δ plays an important role in that it relaxes the pledgeability constraint and once δ < χ α−1 α , increasing η would not mitigate misallocation of resources because it is no longer binding. Therefore, modeling both the interest rate friction and the pledgeability friction not only adds more realism, but also illustrates how various channels could be at work under different economic environments. Correspondingly, policies for mitigating credit misallocation could drastically differ.
Steady States and Permanent Impact
To understand the long-term impact, we derive the steady states of the economy. Rewriting the steady states (SS) of equation ((4)),
Denote the unique positive solution by ψ 0 . Inverting the definition of ψ, we can solve for the steady states interest rates. We can then solve for the steady-state level of capital and labor shares of P firms from equations (2)-(3), which are proportional to the only state variable in the economy s P . Depending on the credit supply, economic environment, and financial frictions, the steady state of the economy can be one of the three types we describe next. In particular, endogenizing interest rates allows us to analyze the eventual level of factor reallocation, which does not obtain in the partial equilibrium in Song et al. (2011) .
First, P firms could replace S firms eventually. This case happens when Q is small relative to s P because P firms are more reliant on private capital and are less disadvantaged in bank credit allocation. This could also happen when µ is large enough that private capital s P can grow very quickly. Second, S firms could completely crowd out P firms in the long run. This happens when Q is large relative to s P or µ is small. In this case,
The most interesting case occurs when S and P firms co-exist. Whether the pledgeability constraint is binding or not, steady-state s is decreasing in Q and increasing in µ. Therefore, when Q increases or µ decreases, s P falls, so does l P (loans borrowed) and k P , n P . Economic recession and credit expansion have long-term impacts. Cross partial in Q and µ is zero, therefore whether credit expansion is cyclical or counter-cyclical does not matter for steady state market share of P firms.
To further analyze the effect of b and η on the level when the pledgeability constraint is binding, we can show that ∂s ∂η is positive if and only if inequality (6) holds, and ∂s ∂b < 0 always holds. Therefore, reducing interest rate friction always increases the fraction of more productive firms in the steady state, and reducing limited pledgeability constraint increases the fraction if P firms are sufficiently more productive relative to S firms. When δ α χ 1−α < 1, the pledgeability constraint is not binding, and increasing pledgeability does not affect the steady state level of s.
Data Description
The main data sources are the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms of the China's National Bureau of Statistics and the bank branch location database of the China Banking Regulatory Commission.
The Annual Survey of Industrial Firms covers firms operating in the manufacturing, mining, and utility sectors from year 1998 to 2013. All firms with annual sales above a given monetary threshold are surveyed, making the survey effectively a Census of medium to large size non-publicly-traded Chinese firms. Until 2010, this threshold was set at 5 million CNY (730,000 USD), and then raised to 20 million CNY (3 million USD) from 2011 onward. 35 Table 1 reports main summary statistics by year for the firms covered in the Annual Industrial Survey.
The firm-level variables of interest are long-term liabilities, total assets, total fixed assets, total sales and number of employees. We use annual changes in long-term liabilities as a proxy for new bank credit, and annual changes in total fixed assets as a proxy for investment. Another key variable in our analysis is state ownership. The Annual Survey of Industrial Firms reports the legal registration status of each firm. One possible definition of SOE is, therefore, firms that are legally registered as "state-owned". However, as underlined by Hsieh and Song (2015) , this definition does not take into account that firms that are ultimately controlled by a state-owned company can actually be legally registered as foreign firms, or limited liability firms. Therefore, following Hsieh and Song (2015) , we define a firm as SOE if either the share of registered capital owned by the state is equal or larger than 50 percent or if the state is reported as the controlling shareholder. Columns (6) and (7) of Table 1 report, by year, the share of firms in our sample with these characteristics. In column (8) we report the share of firms that respond to the Hsieh and Song (2015) definition of SOE. As shown, all these measures of state control have been decreasing over time. For example, the government was the controlling shareholder of 32% of firms in our sample in 1998, and only of 6% of firms a decade later, in 2008. Interestingly, the share of state-controlled firms have stabilized since then.
We also use data on bank branch location from the China Banking Regulatory Commission to construct bank specific proxies for the share of their aggregate corporate lending allocated to different cities. As explained in section 5, the key variable for our analysis is the number of branches of each bank in each city in the year 2005, our baseline year for the empirical analysis. We define cities as the 2 nd administrative division of the Chinese territory, right below provinces. There are 389 cities in our dataset, 332 of which have at least one bank branch in operation in 2005. Figure 5 shows the geographical distribution of bank branches in our dataset in 2005 (upper-left graph) as well as the geographical distribution of branches of three banks in our sample (Bank of China, CITIC Bank and Huishang Bank) as illustrative examples. 36
Identification Strategy
In this section we study empirically the allocation of bank credit across Chinese manufacturing firms and its real effects during the economic stimulus years 2009 and 2010. The main identification challenge we face is to isolate changes in firm borrowing that are solely driven by credit supply forces from those driven by demand or investment opportunities.
In what follows we propose a measure of firm exposure to the credit supply shock generated by the stimulus plan. Empirically, we observe large variation across banks in the increase in corporate lending during the stimulus years. Figure 10 shows the distribution of percentage change in average bank lending between 2007-08 and the stimulus years 2009-10. Only 8 out of 77 banks in our sample experienced a negative percentage change in bank lending in this period, with the median bank experiencing a 48% increase and 13 banks doubling their level of lending in 2009-2010 with respect to 2007-2008. These differences can be driven by differential bank exposure to the stimulus specific policies such as lower reserve requirements and benchmark lending rates. In addition, these differences can be driven by changes in credit demand from their borrowers. Similarly to a Bartik (1991) identification strategy, we exploit variation in bank lending at national level during the stimulus years to construct a firm-specific measure of exposure to the credit increase generated by the stimulus plan. 37 Ideally, in a Bartik-style framework, the credit shock to which firm i is exposed would be equal to:
where b, i, and t index banks, firms, and time respectively. The weights ω bi,t=0 capture the strength of the relationship between firm i and bank b in the pre-stimulus period. The variable ∆Loans b−i,t captures new lending of bank b at national level, excluding lending to firm i. In words, equation (8) uses variation in national lending by banks with which firm i has a pre-existing relationship to construct an instrument for firm i borrowing that is plausibly exogenous with respect to firm i specific credit demand. One important caveat in our setting is that we observe borrowing at firm-level and total corporate lending at bank level, but we do not observe specific bank-firm relationships. Therefore, we write a modified version of equation (8) as follows:
where ω bc,t=0 is the lending market share of bank b in city c, as captured by the share of bank b branches operating in city c as a share of total bank branches in city c. We construct ω bc,t=0 using detailed data on branch addresses from the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Figure 5 shows the geographical distribution of the branch network of four Chinese banks -two large national banks and two small regional banks -as an illustrative example. We define this measure in 2005, in the pre-stimulus period, to avoid that endogenous branch openings in areas more affected by the stimulus polluting our estimates. This allows us to link firm-level borrowing to bank-level lending exploiting variation in the geographical location of the branch network of Chinese banks. In other words, ω bc,t=0 captures the strength of the link between bank b and firm i in the pre-stimulus years.
Similarly to other papers that exploit pre-existing banking relationships to study the effect of changes in credit supply at bank level on firm level outcomes, this identification strategy relies on two assumptions. 38 First, borrower-lender relationships have to be persistent over time such that firms can not easily switch from one lender to another. In our setting, if firms can easily reshape their portfolio of lenders, then variation in l ct should not explain variation in actual firm lending.
The second assumption is that the cross-sectional variation in bank lending during the stimulus years reflects only supply forces or observable borrowers' characteristics, but it is uncorrelated with unobservable borrowers' characteristics that affect their credit demand.
To illustrate the nature of this assumption, we write down a simple model of credit demand and supply as in Greenstone et al. (2015) . Define Loans bt as the national level of corporate lending of bank b at time t. Let us rewrite the national lending of a given bank as a function of supply and demand shifters:
where D t is a national-level demand shifter and Q bt is a bank-level supply shifter. The subscript p identifies provinces, which are a collection of cities indexed by c, while j indexes sectors. The national level demand shifter is therefore a collection of local demand shifters and sector specific demand shifters. The supply shifter, instead, depends on bank-specific characteristics such as the bank's overall financial health or its cost of funds. Notice that equation (10) implicitly assumes that all banks face the same national demand schedule. 39 It is useful to plug this simple definition of bank lending at national level into equation (9) to obtain:
Equation (11) shows that local shocks to demand in city c and province p where firm i operates enter into the definition of l ct , violating the identification assumption. Similarly, national shocks to demand in sector j where firm i operates also enter into the definition of l ct . One potential solution often used in the construction of Bartik-style shocks is to remove lending to the specific location or sector where firm i operates from the summation in equation (11). In our setting, we cannot pursue this route, because we do not directly observe lending of bank b to a specific location or sector. In what follows, we propose a simple methodology to back out Bartik-style credit supply shocks in frameworks where firm-level outcomes and bank-level lending data are available but bank-firm relationships are not directly observable. Our solution to this identification challenge relies on using province and sector fixed effects interacted with year dummies. To illustrate this strategy, let us rewrite equation (11) as follows:
Taking logs on both sides we obtain: 39 One way to think about this assumption is that firms post credit applications to all banks every period no matter their location or sector of operation.
Notice that the first element of this equation is the exposure to local demand shifters, the second element is the exposure to sector-specific demand shifters, and the third element captures the average credit supply shifter across banks operating in the city where firm i operates. Our objective is to single out the effect of this last element on firm borrowing.
To this end, let us write down a simple equation that relates actual borrowing of firm i to its exposure to national level changes in bank lending. We add to this specification the interaction of province and year fixed effects, and the interaction of sector and year fixed effects, as follows:
Equation (13) is the equation that we estimate in the data. To show that the coefficient β on log l ct captures exclusively changes in credit supply, let us substitute in equation (13) the definition of log l ct obtained in equation (12):
Notice from equation (14) that fixed effects at sector level interacted with time dummies (α jt ) fully capture sector-specific demand shocks. However, fixed effects at province level interacted with time dummies still do not fully capture city-level demand shocks. Therefore, our identification relies on the strong assumption that credit demand shifters are highly correlated across cities within the same province. We partially relax this assumption in the empirical analysis by controlling for initial city characteristics interacted with year fixed effects. To the extent that differences in business cycle across cities within the same province are determined by differences in initial city characteristics, such as income per capita, size, or share of rural population, then these controls fully capture city-level demand shifters. Under this assumption, equation (14) can be rewritten as:
where: δ t = α t ; δ pt = α pt + βωµ p log(Π p (Π c D µc ct )) ; δ jt = α jt + βων j log(Π j D jt )
Similarly to a Bartik-style shock in which the econometrician observes and can therefore remove from national variation in lending the loans to a specific county, we are effectively purging our estimate from time varying common shocks in both the province and the sector in which firm i operates. Therefore, the coefficient β should capture variation in firm-level borrowing that is exclusively driven by bank level credit supply shocks. In other words, when estimating equation (13) we are effectively comparing firms that are subject to the same province-level demand shocks and to the same sector-level demand shocks but are differently exposed to bank national credit supply shocks.
Empirical results
In section 2.2, we documented a set of basic stylized facts that are present in our data. In particular, we showed how manufacturing firms covered by the Annual Industrial Survey experienced a sharp increase in long-term debt during the two years of the stimulus plan (2009 and 2010) . We also documented how this increase in long-term debt has been larger for state owned firms relative to private firms, and for firms with lower marginal productivity of capital. The timing of the differential increase in long-term debt for different firms is suggestive of this effect being driven by the stimulus plan. To rule out other explanations such as different exposure of certain sectors to the contemporaneous decrease in demand due to the global financial crisis, we now use the identification strategy proposed in section 5 to plausibly identify exposure to credit supply shocks and establish our results on allocation of credit and its real effects during the stimulus years. We proceed in three steps. First, we show that our measure of exposure to bank credit supply shocks effectively explains variation in firm borrowing. Second, we study the allocation of credit across firms by interacting our measure of exposure to credit supply shocks with initial firm characteristics. In this step we are particularly interested in investigating whether banks allocated funds differently during the stimulus years between state owned firms and non state owned firms, and between firms with different initial levels of marginal product of capital. Finally, in the third step, we investigate the real effects of credit allocation during the stimulus years.
Bank Credit Supply Shock and Firm Borrowing
We start by testing the effect of bank level credit supply shocks on firm borrowing. The baseline equation that we estimate is equation (13) described in section 5, which we report here for convenience:
where ∆y jict is an outcome that varies across firms indexed by i. The subscript c identifies cities, p identifies provinces, j identifies 4-digit sectors and t identifies years. The coefficient of interest is β, that capture the effect of bank credit supply shock in a given city and year on changes in firm-level outcomes. Our measure of bank credit supply shock is defined as follows:
where ω bc,t=0 is our proxy for bank b lending market share in city c, and it is constructed as the share of branches of bank b in city c over total bank branches operating in city c in year 2005. The variable ∆Loans b,t is the yearly change in the stock of outstanding corporate loans of bank b between year t − 1 and t. The specification includes province and sector fixed effects interacted with time fixed effects, to capture local demand shock as well as industry specific demand shocks, as showed in equation (15). As discussed in section 5, our identification strategy relies on credit demand shocks being similar across cities in a given province. Table 3 reports a standard balancedness test in which we report the correlation between exposure to credit supply shock during the stimulus years and initial city characteristics. For example, cities with larger exposure to credit supply shock used to have around 10% higher GDP per capita in the pre-stimulus period (all city characteristics are observed in 2005). Therefore, if cities with different initial level of development -as captured by GDP per capita -within a given province experienced different credit demand during this period, our estimates might be capturing these trends rather than credit supply shocks. To partially address this concern, we add to the equation to be estimated city-level initial characteristics interacted with year fixed effects. In particular, we control for those initial characteristics that are correlated with exposure to credit supply shock during stimulus years: GDP per capita, population and population density. We also control for observable firm characteristics that can affect credit demand such as firms size, age and export status. In particular, one concern is that firms that are exporters might have received a negative demand shock during the stimulus years, due to lower global demand. The final equation to be estimated is reported below:
where X i,t−1 are firm-level controls and Z c,t=0 are city characteristics observed in 2005. Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (18) when the outcome variable is the change in long-term liabilities between year t − 1 and year t, divided by revenues in year t−1. 40 To insure comparability over time we restrict our sample to firms with annual sales above 20 million CNY, for which we effectively observe the whole population in every year. Notice that our data on bank-level corporate loans (∆Loans bt ) is only available starting from 2008, which implies we estimate equation (16) for the time period 2009 to 2013. The estimated coefficients reported in Table 4 show that firms with larger exposure to bank credit supply shocks experienced a larger increase in borrowing. In column 1 we estimate equation (16) including year fixed effects, as well as province and sector fixed effects interacted with year fixed effects. In column 2 we include the set of initial city characteristics interacted with year fixed effects. Finally, in column 3 we estimate the full specification showed in equation 18, including firm-level controls. As shown, the size of the estimated coefficient on the bank credit supply shock is relatively stable across specifications, and precisely estimated in all specifications. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient reported in column 3, our preferred specification, indicates that a firm with a 1 standard deviation larger exposure to bank credit supply shocks experiences a .19 percentage point larger increase in long-term liabilities as a share of revenues.
Credit Allocation under Stimulus Plan
In the previous section we showed how our measure of firm exposure to bank credit supply shocks predicts actual borrowing at firm level across all years between 2009 and 2013. Our objective, in this section, is to study the allocation of new loans by banks during the stimulus years 2009 and 2010. In particular, we are interested in studying whether banks allocated funds differently during the stimulus years between state owned firms and non state owned firms, as well as between firms with different initial levels of marginal product of capital. To this end, we estimate the following version of equation (16):
where the variable C icjt−1 is a pre-determined firm characteristic and captures, depending on the specification, either the ownership status of firm i or its initial marginal product of capital. The coefficient of interest is β 1 , which captures the differential effect of exposure to bank credit supply shocks on firm borrowing depending on initial firm characteristics. We focus on two main firm characteristics: state-ownership and initial marginal productivity of capital, both defined in year 2007. 41 40 All monetary variables are CPI adjusted. 41 As discussed in the section 4 and showed in Table 1 , the variable I(State Owned Firm) is not available Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (19) when the outcome variable is the change in long-term liabilities between year t − 1 and year t, divided by revenues in year t − 1. We start by testing the main effect of l ct on firm borrowing. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of estimating the effect of exposure to bank credit supply shock on firm borrowing. This is to check that our measure of exposure explains changes in firm long-term liabilities also when we focus on the stimulus years 2009 and 2010. The estimated coefficient on l ct is positive, precisely estimated, and robust to controlling for firm characteristics and differential trends for cities with different initial characteristics.
In columns 3 and 4, we report the results of estimating equation (19) when C icjt−1 captures state-ownership of firm i. The estimated coefficient β 1 is positive and significant in both specifications. This indicates that state-owned firms experienced a relatively larger increase in borrowing with respect to private firms when exposed to the same bank credit supply shock. The estimated coefficient β 2 is also positive (although not statistically significant when adding all controls), which indicates that the differential effect in firm borrowing between SOE and private firms is on top of a positive increase in private firms borrowing in response to a credit supply shock. However, notice how the magnitude of the estimated β 2 is smaller in size with respect to columns 1 and 2. Taken together, the magnitudes of the estimated β 1 and β 2 coefficients in column 4 indicates that, in response to a 1 standard deviation change in exposure to credit supply shock, state-owned firms experience a .31 percentage points increase in new loans, versus the 0.03 percentage points for private firms (both as a share of firm revenues). In other words, the elasticity of firm borrowing to the exposure to credit supply shock is around 10 times larger for state-owned firms than for private firms during the stimulus years. Finally, notice that the estimated coefficient on the main effect of state-ownership status is negative and significant. Our interpretation of this coefficient is that, in the absence of a credit supply shock generated by the stimulus plan, state-owned firms would experience a lower increase in borrowing with respect to private firms.
Finally, in column 5 and 6 of Table 5 , we report the results of estimating equation (19) when C icjt−1 is equal to the firm-level marginal product of capital in year 2007. Marginal product of capital is defined as the logarithm of industrial value added divided by book value of fixed assets. 42 The estimated coefficient on the interaction between exposure to credit supply shock and initial marginal product of capital is negative and precisely estimated. This indicates that, when exposed to the same bank credit supply shock, firms with lower initial marginal product of capital experienced a relatively larger increase in borrowing with respect to firms with initially higher marginal product of capital. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient β 1 indicates that firms with a 1 standard deviation in the years 2008 and 2009. 42 In this definition marginal product of capital is equivalent to average product of capital. The underlying assumptions are identical labor share and mark-ups within a given sector. larger M P K experienced a 0.42 percentage points lower increase in new loans (as a share of revenues) during the 2009-2010 period. This result suggests an increase in credit misallocation during stimulus years. In addition, it is consistent with state-owned firms experiencing a relatively larger increase in new loans during the stimulus years with respect to private firms. 43 Notice that both main effects on the exposure to the credit supply shock and on the initial marginal product of capital are positive and significant. In particular, the positive estimated coefficient on log M P K indicates that, net of the credit supply shock, firms with higher marginal product of capital would have experienced a higher increase in new loans during the stimulus years.
Real Effects of Credit Allocation
In the previous section we showed that, during the stimulus years, bank credit supply has disproportionately favored state-owned firms and firms with lower initial marginal product of capital. In this section we investigate the real effects of this credit allocation. In particular, we focus on firm investment. To this end, we estimate equation (19) using as outcome variable the change in total fixed assets between year t − 1 and year t, again scaled by total revenues in year t − 1.
Results are reported in Table 6 . As in Table 5 , we start by separately testing the main effect of firm exposure to credit supply shock ( l ct ) on firm investment. The estimated coefficients on l ct reported in columns 1 and 2 are positive and precisely estimated. The magnitude indicates that a firms with a 1 standard deviation larger exposure to bank credit supply shock experience a 0.3 percentage points larger increase in total fixed assets as a share of revenues.
In columns 3 and 4 we report the results of estimating equation (19) when the variable C icjt−1 captures state-ownership. The estimated coefficient β 1 on the interaction between exposure to credit supply shock and state-ownership is positive but not statistically different from zero at standard levels of significance. This suggests that, despite the difference in firm borrowing, state-owned firms and private firms with same exposure to the credit supply shock experience similar increase in investment. In columns 5 and 6 we report the results of estimating equation (19) when the variable C icjt−1 is the initial marginal product of capital. In this specification we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction, and the estimated β 1 is stable in size when adding controls. This suggests that firms with lower initial marginal product of capital invested relatively 43 Several papers have documented how state-owned firms are, on average, less productive than private firms in China. For example, Song et al. (2011) show that SOE have, on average, 9% lower profitability than private firms in the years 1998 to 2007. Similarly, Brandt et al. (2005) find large differences between SOE and non-SOE in terms of TFP. Hsieh and Song (2015) show that the gap in marginal product of capital between SOE and non-SOE has been closing in the years between 1999 and 2007, but nonetheless find that, in 2007, "capital productivity among state-owned firms and privatized firms remained about 40 percent lower (compared to private firms)." more during the stimulus years. In particular, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient β 1 indicates that firms with a 1 standard deviation larger M P K experienced a 0.96 percentage points lower increase in investment (as a share of revenues) during the 2009-2010 period. We interpret this finding as evidence of misallocation of physical capital. Notice that, as in Table 5 , the estimated coefficient on the main effect of marginal product of capital is positive and significant. This indicates that, in the absence of exposure to credit supply shock, initially more productive firms would experience a higher increase in capital investment.
Robustness
One major challenge in disentangling demand from supply forces in our identification strategy is that we cannot account for potentially different demand shocks experienced by state-owned and non-state-owned firms that operate in the same province and narrowly defined sector. One alternative explanation for our results is, for example, that stateowned firms were directly required by the central government to increase credit demand in order to expand investment in infrastructure and construction. As we already mentioned, the firm-level survey used in our paper focuses exclusively on manufacturing firms that should not be affected, at least directly, by this type of policies. However, some stateowned manufacturing firms might have received a higher demand shock than private firms operating in the same sector and province because they are input providers of other state-owned firms operating in the construction and utilities sector. As we report in section 2, the Chinese stimulus program of 2009 and 2010 included a fiscal plan that prominently featured a large increase in infrastructure expenditure by the central and local governments. Construction companies are not included in our sample. Nevertheless, if, for example, state-owned construction companies were more likely to buy inputs from state-owned steel companies, this increase in public expenditure in the construction sector would generate an asymmetric demand shock for state-owned versus non-state-owned firms.
To rule out this mechanism, in this section we show that the heterogeneous effects across SOE and non-SOE to the credit supply shock showed in Table 5 are not driven by firms operating in sectors that are direct input supplier to the construction and utilities sectors. To identify main input suppliers we use the OECD Input-Output Tables for China. 44 The main input suppliers for the construction sector are industries in the basic metal production, which include smelting and pressing of ferrous metals -such as iron and steel -and non-ferrous metals. The main input suppliers for the utilities sector are instead industries operating in mining and quarrying, which include: coal mining and dressing, petroleum and natural gas extraction, mining and dressing of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, non-metal ores and other mining industries. Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (19) for the same outcomes as Table  5 , but excluding firms operating in the Basic Metals production sectors (columns 1 and 2) and in the Mining and Quarrying sectors (columns 3 and 4). As shown, the point estimate for β 1 , our coefficient of interest, are similar in magnitude to those reported in Table 5 . The results indicate that potential differences between state-owned and private firms operating in the same sector and province due to differential demand from the construction and utilities sector are not driving our results.
Conclusions
This paper studies credit allocation across firms in a dynamic economy with financial frictions. Adding to the existing literature, we show that recessions can hinder efficient factor reallocation. This is the result of two forces: (i) financial frictions favoring stateconnected firms becoming more prominent during recessions -for example, due to implicit bail-out of SOEs or career concerns of loan officers -, and (ii) lower average productivity of state-connected firms. Policy-driven credit expansions in response to recessions can amplify this effect.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the Chinese economic stimulus plan introduced at the end of 2008 in response to the Great Recession. In particular, we focus on the credit expansion policies such as lower required reserve ratios and lower benchmark lending rates for commercial banks. We show that these credit expansion policies had a broader impact on the Chinese economy besides facilitating off-balance-sheet borrowing by local governments, an aspect so far overlooked by the existing literature. Using plausibly exogenous changes in bank credit supply and firm-level data on Chinese manufacturing firms, we show that -during the stimulus years -bank credit was allocated disproportionately more towards state-owned or state-controlled firms and firms with lower initial marginal productivity of capital, corroborating our theoretical mechanism. In addition, larger allocation of bank credit to these firms had real effects in terms of larger capital investment.
Our findings illustrate how financial frictions, business cycle, and credit expansion can interact, leading to potentially unintended consequences of intervention policy. They are therefore informative for developing countries that undertook large stimulus programs in response to the Great Recession and whose credit markets are plagued by severe frictions. Benchmark lending rate (6m-1y)
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Notes: Shaded areas indicate stimulus program period (2008:Q4 to 2010:Q4). Data on actual reserve ratios is from WIND and comes aggregated by bank category. Banks are categorized by WIND into: state-owned, jointly-owned, and city commercial banks before 2010. Starting from 2010, these three categories have been re-labeled as, respectively: large, medium, and small banks, which is why we report them in different colors in the graphs. We match the WIND categories to the Central Bank categories of "large" and "medium and small" banks to which different RRR apply. For the joint-owned (then medium) banks, we report both RRRs as some of them are subject to the RRR for large banks. In the bottom-right graph we report the benchmark lending rate set by the Central Bank for loans with maturity between 6 months and 1 year. As a sanity check, we report in the same graph the interest rate of loans to Chinese publicly listed firms as officially announced in company statements. Trillion CNY 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
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Notes: The figure shows the estimated coefficient β in equation (1) when C icjt−1 = I(State Owned Firm) icjt−1 , along with 95 percent confidence intervals, when the outcome variable at firm level is change in long-term liabilities between t − 1 and t over revenues at t − 1. We estimate equation (1) 1999 2000-2002 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 2011-2013 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Table 1 , this variable is not available in the years 2008 and 2009. log M P K is the natural log of industrial value added divided by book value of fixed assets. It is defined in year t − 1 , with the only exception of years 2009 and 2010, where log M P K refers to year 2007. Notice also that information on industrial value added is not available in our data for the years 2011 to 2013, which is why the estimated coefficient is missing in column (7). All regression include as control for firm size the log of average number of workers in year t − 1. To insure comparability over time we restrict our sample to firms with annual revenues above 20 million CNY (CPI adjusted, in 2000 CNY). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm) is an indicator function equal to 1 if the firm is a SOE, and it is defined in 2007. We define SOE as described in Section 4. log M P K is the natural log of industrial value added divided by book value of fixed assets, and it is defined in 2007. City initial characteristics include: log gdp per capita, log population density and log population, all observed in 2005. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm) is an indicator function equal to 1 if the firm is a SOE, and it is defined in 2007. We define SOE as described in Section 4. log M P K is the natural log of industrial value added divided by book value of fixed assets, and it is defined in 2007. City initial characteristics include: log gdp per capita, log population density and log population, all observed in 2005. Basic Metals production include: smelting and pressing of ferrous metals (iron and steel) and non-ferrous metals. Mining and quarrying includes: coal mining and dressing, petroleum and natural gas extraction, mining and dressing of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, non-metal ores and other mining industries.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
